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Abstract
This paper is a response to Serge Grigoriev's article "Living
Art, Defining Value: Artworks and Mere Real Things"
(Contemporary Aesthetics Volume 3, 2005) in which he
develops Joseph Margolis' provocative Danto-criticism. He
especially criticizes Danto's art-philosophical starting point, the
problem of indiscernibles, claiming that it presupposes an
objective value judgment that cannot be maintained and that
it misrepresents the way in which people interact with art. In
this article, Grigoriev's argument is found lacking mainly on
two grounds. First, it overlooks where the source of Danto's
starting point lies; and second, I argue that it does not lead to
the kind of radical dualism Grigoriev believes. In order to show
the problematic aspects of Grigoriev's criticism, Danto's
conception of philosophy is introduced together with certain
ideas from his latest work, The Abuse of Beauty.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
Some time ago, Joseph Margolis argued in an article with the
provocative title, "Farewell to Danto and Goodman," that the
logical conclusion of Arthur Danto's theory of art is that
artworks do not, in fact, exist.[1] This, however, was only the
tip of the iceberg because a similar claim against Danto can
also be found from Margolis' previous works.[2] Perhaps the
reason for Margolis' sudden aggressive outburst was that these
writings had not aroused discussion over his provocative
challenge against perhaps the most influential theory of
contemporary analytic aesthetics. This article had better
success because it provoked a response from Danto himself in
which he tried to show the criticism invalid and the farewells
premature.[3] No third party, however, has taken a clear
stand on the disagreement until quite recently, when Serge
Grigoriev defended Margolis' argument against Danto and
elaborated the criticism even further.[4] Despite its
challenging nature, his argument is less provocative than
Margolis' because Grigoriev admits the intuitive appeal of the
kind of contextualist theory of art that Danto supports,
whereas Margolis does not seem to find any value in it,
claiming that what Danto found to be the necessary
constituents of our interaction with art are in fact "unlikely,
unnecessary, overly complicated, counterintuitive, ultimately
incoherent, [. . .]"[5]
The starting point of both Grigoriev and Margolis is the same:
the problematic nature of Danto's distinction between an
artwork and an indiscernible "mere real thing," but their
conclusions differ slightly. Margolis claims that precisely this
distinction is the reason why artworks cannot be real in
Danto's idiom, whereas Grigoriev thinks it fails to embrace
certain important ingredients in our interaction with art. It
presupposes a value judgment between artworks and real
things that is unwanted and philosophically dubious because,
as Margolis' relativistic theory shows, there is no objective,
neutral, evaluative criteria to ground such a distinction.
Although the distinction is helpful as a tool for analyzing pop-
art and readymade works, considering that these are among
the anomalies of our artistic tradition a comprehensive
aesthetic theory cannot be built on these kinds of examples.
(Sec. 3.)
In this article, I will not touch Margolis' criticism because it
would require introducing the complexities of his cultural
realism and robust relativism with which he tries to challenge
Danto's theory. I confine myself to abstracting two critical
remarks that Grigoriev makes against Danto and seeing
whether he could at least postpone the arrangements of his
farewell party.
My first critical remark involves the dubious value judgment
Grigoriev thinks Danto's distinction between artworks and real
things presupposes. My argument is that Grigoriev has
misperceived the nature of the distinction and that it does not
contain the kind of normative element he believes it does.
Secondly, I contest Grigoriev's claim that Danto's theory is a
"version of radical reductive rationalism" (sec. 2) "in which a
thing's meaning is radically separated from its identity qua
physical object" (sec. 3). In order to counter this claim, I will
also introduce Danto's latest ideas.
2. Danto's Conception of Philosophy and the "Mere Real
Thing"
Danto has had an extremely long philosophical career, and the
distinction between artworks and mere real things has been an
important part of it since the publication of the seminal article,
"The Artworld" (1964). Starting from this distinction, Danto
arrived at the conclusion that "to see something as art
requires something the eye cannot descry - an atmosphere of
artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an
artworld."[6] What this thesis implies is that the visual
properties of the object alone cannot constitute an object as a
work of art; a certain kind of art historical context is
necessary. Two objects, like the famous Brillo-objects of
Warhol and Harvey, can be visually indiscernible from one
another, but still they have totally different properties since
one is an artwork and the other only a mere real thing. As
Noël Carroll has argued, this argument form has a
transcendental character in it: There must be a difference
between the two objects, but because no other thing than the
concept of the artworld can separate them, contextuality must
be a necessary condition for arthood.[7]
Grigoriev understands the argument perfectly but he rejects
the conclusion, proposing a theory more in line with empiricist
leanings as an alternative, which maintains "that experiencing
an artwork is tantamount to being affected by its manifest and
objectively verifiable properties" (sec. 1). Our interaction with
art does not involve or presuppose the kind of theoretical
mediation supposed by Danto but "an experience of
enculturation that molds one's sensibilities on a level that often
bypasses self-conscious intellection" (sec. 2). Grigoriev is,
therefore, arguing that there isn't the kind of theoretical or
conceptual leap from the realm of mere things to artworks
that Danto thinks there is. The distinction assumed by Danto
can lead to the extreme conclusion that the sensible
properties, which directly affect us in our encounters with
artworks, are sacrificed to the value, which is ascribed to
works "within the theoretical space of reasons" (sec. 2). For
this reason, Danto's philosophical starting point must be
rejected.
Two problems, however, are embodied in this counter-
argument. First, it overlooks the origin of Danto's starting
point, which, in turn, leads Grigoriev to misrepresent the
theoretical presuppositions of the distinction. And secondly, it
does not see the complex relationship which the indiscernible
counterpart has to the work in its constitution. The first
problem is addressed here and the second in the sec. 3,
below.
Considering how obsessed Danto seems to be with drawing the
distinction between artworks and mere things, it is not
surprising that it is widely discussed. But it is surprising that
people seem to overlook where the distinction derives from.
This is Danto's conception of philosophy, according to which
the general task of philosophy is to deal with the questions
that emerge from the distinction between appearance and
reality. Why is this event or object the real thing and, in this
sense, part of reality when an indiscernible counterpart is not
and thus only an appearance? This corresponds to Danto's art-
philosophical starting point, but what should be noted in this
instance is that the problem extends to the fields of
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of action, philosophy of
mind, and ethics, etc. Metaphysics and epistemology have to
this day been plagued by Descartes' problem: how dreams can
be separated from reality when they cannot be told apart by
perceptual criteria. Without an answer to this problem,
Descartes, of course, thought we would be on the verge of
skepticism. In the philosophy of action, it involves the
distinction between mere bodily movements and actions, both
of which can be visually indiscernible from one another. What
then separates the former from the latter? John Searle's
famous Chinese-Room argument has a similar structure. The
persons in different rooms give indiscernible answers to the
questions given, but still Searle thinks that only one of the
cases is a case of true ability to use language. The questions,
therefore, are what separates real understanding from a mere
appearance of it and, finally, what separates an artwork from
a mere real thing?[8]
This is how, in Danto's opinion, philosophy works. But if this
conception is taken into account, what does this prove against
Grigoriev? I think it clearly shows that he has misperceived
the artwork/mere real thing distinction because, after revealing
its true nature, it does not involve a normative element as he
thinks any more than the distinction between an action and a
mere bodily movement or between dream and reality does.
But if it does not involve a reference to a value judgment,
Grigoriev must be wrong in claiming that Clement Greenberg's
art/commodity distinction corresponds to Danto's art/mere real
thing distinction. Together with the sociopolitical criticism, for
example concerning the role of the art theorist in society that
he uses against Danto, these do not, at the end, hit their
target. (sec. 2) They might hit Greenberg but not necessarily
Danto.
What follows from this is that it is possible to maintain Danto's
distinction even after Grigoriev's criticism because the
existence of objective value criteria is irrelevant to the
question. It is no more a value judgment than the distinction
between bodily movements and actions. But if it does not
involve a value judgment, there need not be any objective
normative principles to ground it. The distinction can be
sustained by other means.
One could, of course, claim that the distinction presupposes
the existence of a certain kind of pure perception that could
report the properties of the indiscernible counterpart, and that
something like this does not exist, as Margolis seems to be
arguing.[9] This, of course, involves huge philosophical
questions that I cannot consider here, but what I would like to
point out is that it is not only Danto who is using these kinds
of thought examples that involve indiscernibility between two
objects or events. Grigoriev shares this view, claiming that a
similar kind of distinction has "continued to resurface on a
regular basis in philosophical literature" (sec. 2), but he seems
to be referring to the literature of aesthetics, for example
Jerrold Levinson and Richard Wollheim (sec 1).[10] What
should be noted is that philosophy of art is not the only place
where these kinds of Danto-like thought examples are used.
There's Hilary Putnam's "brains in the vat" and "Twin-Earth;"
Tyler Burge's scenarios where the speech situations in the
doctor's office are visually indiscernible but happen in different
linguistic communities; Donald Davidson's "swamp man;"
Searle's Chinese Room argument, of course; and many others.
What does this analogy prove? I'm only saying that if you
think the indiscernibility cases are invalid in Danto's case, they
must be also in the above cases. And to show that Danto's
argument is invalid would mean showing that some of the
most important ideas introduced in contemporary philosophy of
language and mind also rest on a fundamental mistake. One
could, of course, argue that there is something in the nature
of aesthetics as a discipline that would make the use of these
kinds of thought examples implausible, but Grigoriev does not
provide this kind of argument.
3. Internal Beauty and the Interaction between the
Artwork and the Mere Real Thing.
The argument of the previous part, I believe, shows that the
distinction can be maintained. Grigoriev could argue, of
course, that it should not be sustained because it
misrepresents the way we interact with art. In order to
challenge Grigoriev's second claim that in Danto's theory "a
thing's meaning is radically separated from its identity qua
physical object" (sec. 3), I have to draw ideas from Danto's
latest work, The Abuse of Beauty, which Diarmuid Costello has
called "Danto's most sustained reflection to date on the
relation [. . .] between art and aesthetics. . .".[11] However,
as Danto himself states, the ideas introduced in the work have
a firm connection to his previous works and especially to the
problem that is at issue here, i.e., the problem of
indiscernibles.[12] At the end of his article, Grigoriev says that
his intention has been "to review the current state of the
[Danto's] argument," (sec. 3) but his review remains a bit
shortsighted because he overlooks the relevance of Danto's
latest work. As Costello claims,and I believe correctly, the
most important theoretical innovation of the work is the
distinction between internal and external beauty.[13] When
the distinction is worked out, I believe, Grigoriev's remarks are
put into a new light.
What does this distinction involve? Lately, Danto has
construed artworks as "embodied meanings."[14] The concept
of meaning is also central for this distinction, for it involves
the question, What relationship does the surface or discernible
properties of the work have to its meaning? In the case of
internal beauty, they are interrelated because "the thought
belongs to the work and explains [its] beauty."[15] If there is
no such connection between the two, it is an example of
external beauty, in which case the meaning does not enter into
the explanation of the aesthetic nature of the surface
properties. There is only a contingent relationship between
what the work means and the way it looks. From here, one
can see a clear connection to Danto's central "agenda [. . .] to
work out the relationship of objects to works."[16] Some
properties can be part of the embodied material of the
artwork, i.e., the mere real thing, without being properties of
the work itself. The distinction is the task of interpretation,
which constitutes the work.[17]
Jonathan Gilmore uses a fine example to elucidate the
distinction. It was irrelevant for the aesthetic nature of
Warhol's Brillo Box that it was made of plywood. A similar
wooden material would have done as well, and a change of
material would not have affected the aesthetic nature of the
work because the meaning of the work would not have
changed. In this sense, the properties of the plywood were
external to the Brillo Box as a work of art.
Gilmore contrasts this with Donald Judd's art where the
relation between material and meaning is different. In this
case, the chosen material is "constitutive" for the work
because it was the artist's intention to give his work an
identity "as low-grade construction material. . . [in order] to
block associations with artfulness, craft, and uniqueness. .
."[18] The material chosen by Judd was significant for the
aesthetic nature of his work because it had an intended
connection with the meaning of the work and its content. This
is a case of internal beauty, because there is a connection
between surface properties and meaning; the aesthetic nature
of the work is explained by its meaning.
This distinction points to another important factor in the light
of Grigoriev's comments because, for Danto, internal beauty
"colors" (Frege's Farbung) the meaning of the work, which, in
turn, "inflects" us to see the content or the meaning of the
work in a certain light. These "pragmatic qualities" of artworks,
as Danto calls them, "are intended to dispose an audience to
have feelings of one sort or another toward what the artwork
represents."[19] So, internal beauty does not merely affect the
aesthetic nature of the work but also the way we experience
it.
These considerations, I think, not only prove that the
relationship between an artwork and the embodied material is
much tighter in Danto's theory than Grigoriev believes, but
also that it is a question which has to be sorted out case-by-
case. The relationship can be different in different works
because the artwork/mere real thing relationship insisted on
by Danto has to be understood differently in different cases.
Grigoriev writes "in the end it is theory that makes an artwork
out of a mere real thing" (sec. 3), but I would rather say it is
an individual interpretation. What does it mean in Judd's case
that he made his works out of these "mere real things"?
Gilmore rightly claims that the idea of internal beauty suggests
that how the artwork looks and how it means must be
interrelated.[20] The way it looks, on the other hand, inflects
us to see its meaning in a certain light. However, if the looks
are part of the mere real thing, there must be some kind of
problem in Grigoriev's argument because he separates the
physical thing from the artwork much more radically than
Danto does. But since his criticism was based on this kind of
radical separateness, Grigoriev's comments seem to lose their
critical force. I think the analysis of internal beauty shows,
pace Grigoriev, that there need be nothing artificial or
mechanistic in Danto's distinction and in the kind of
contextualism it leads to. If the way the object looks and the
way the artwork means are interrelated, I cannot see why
Danto could not agree with Grigoriev's correct observation that
attention should be drawn to the "artwork itself, qua an
accomplished product, making it the focus of aesthetic
sensibility" (sec. 1). Grigoriev claims "an artwork is good
insofar as it works" (ibid.). For Danto, they are successful
when they manage to inflect us. The mere thing, therefore,
does not become "an indifferent object" as Grigoriev argues
(sec. 2).
To sum up, Grigoriev's mistake is twofold. First, he overlooks
how Danto's conception of philosophy functions behind the
problem of indiscernibles. If its presence is accepted, it shows
that the distinction does not involve a value judgment as
presupposed by Grigoriev. But since his counterargument is
mainly based on its existence, his criticism does not manage
to undermine Danto's starting point. Secondy, the distinction
need not lead to the kind of radical dualism Grigoriev thinks it
does because, as the concept of internal beauty and especially
Gilmore's Judd-example proves, there is a particular
interaction between the artwork as a meaningful entity and
the material qua material entity.
Because I have made only small references to Margolis'
criticism in this article, my views cannot be considered a full-
blown defense of Danto. But since Grigoriev's and Margolis'
arguments share common ground, I believe if the former can
be shown to be problematic, there is also the possibility of
answering the latter. For these reasons, I must share Danto's
feelings that "the farewells are a bit premature."[21] They are
also premature because although The Abuse of Beauty clearly
embodies Danto's philosophical method whose validity Margolis
has undermined, in this work Danto makes new comments
especially on the themes which Grigoriev addresses in his
paper. My claim is that aesthetics cannot be in a "position to
move past" Danto's theory if they are not taken into account
since, as Jonathan Gilmore points out, the work continues
Danto's "ongoing philosophical re-enfranchisement of art", by
showing us "how it [beauty] enters into traffic with a human
world."[22]
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